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Propensity score matchingcts of ﬁnancial liberalization on growth and volatility at the industry level in a
large sample of countries. We estimate the impact of liberalization on production, employment, ﬁrm entry,
capital accumulation, and productivity. In order to overcome omitted variables concerns, we employ a
number of alternative difference-in-differences estimation strategies. We implement a propensity score
matching algorithm to ﬁnd a control group for each liberalizing country. In addition, we exploit variation in
industry characteristics to obtain an alternative set of difference-in-differences estimates. Financial
liberalization is found to have a positive effect on both growth and volatility of production across industries.
The positive growth effect comes from increased entry of ﬁrms, higher capital accumulation, and an
expansion in total employment. By contrast, we do not detect any effect of ﬁnancial liberalization on
measured productivity. Finally, the growth effects of liberalization appear temporary rather than permanent.
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Financial markets have been liberalized dramatically in many
countries over the past three decades. Fig. 1 depicts recent trends in
the indicators of ﬁnancial openness. Most de jure measures of
restrictions on domestic capital allocation or international capital ﬂows
show a strong trend towards liberalization. Indeed, capital ﬂows across
borders have correspondinglygrownat a higher pace than theexpansion
of goods trade, and much faster than GDP. What are the effects of
ﬁnancial liberalization? In spite of a theoretical case that ﬁnancial
liberalization should improve the allocation of capital and increase
growth, the growth effects of ﬁnancial liberalization have not been easy
to demonstrate in cross-country data. At the same time, worries persist
that ﬁnancial liberalization may result in higher volatility.1Fund, 700 19th Street NW,
ranciere@imf.org (R. Rancière),
sition of basic facts about the
ng literature on its growth and
ll rights reserved.This paper examines the relationship between ﬁnancial liberal-
ization, growth, and volatility using a large industry-level panel
dataset. The empirical analysis answers three sets of questions. First,
what is the impact of ﬁnancial liberalization on output growth and
volatility at the industry level? Both growth and volatility effects have
been analyzed separately in cross-country data. However, to obtain a
reliable estimate of the their relative importance it is essential to
consider these effects within a uniﬁed empirical framework. Second,
what are the channels through which ﬁnancial liberalization affects
growth? And third, are the effects of ﬁnancial liberalizationpermanent
or temporary? The answers to the last two questions shed light on the
nature of the relationship between liberalization and growth, and can
help distinguish between the different theoretical possibilities.
The main ﬁndings can be summarized as follows. Financial
liberalization increases both growth and volatility of output. These
effects are robust to a variety of speciﬁcations and estimation
strategies. The growth effect is driven by higher employment, greater
capital accumulation, and greater ﬁrm entry. By contrast, we do not
detect any impact of liberalization on TFP growth. Finally, the growth
impact is temporary rather than permanent: for output, ﬁrm entry,
and employment, the effect decreases in magnitude over time, and
Fig. 1.Worldwide ﬁnancial liberalization trends. The world gross capital ﬂows/GDP are
the sum of the gross capital ﬂows across countries, divided by world GDP, in each year.
Source: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics and World Bank's World Development
Indicators. De jure liberalization is the average composite index of ﬁnancial liberal-
ization across countries in each year. The index ranges from 1 (least liberalized) to 3
(fully liberalized). Source: Kaminsky and Schmukler, (2008).
211A.A. Levchenko et al. / Journal of Development Economics 89 (2009) 210–222becomes insigniﬁcant after 6 years, while the impact on capital
accumulation is slightlymore long-lasting. The only persistent effect is
on competition: the impact of ﬁnancial liberalization on the price-cost
margin – a measure of markups – increases progressively for the ﬁrst
few post-liberalization years, and remains signiﬁcantly negative
throughout the period we analyze. We conclude that ﬁnancial
liberalization has a permanent effect on the level of output, but no
persistent effect on output growth. While the effect of ﬁnancial
liberalization on volatility is also most pronounced on impact, we
cannot rule out the possibility of a permanent increase in the variance
of output growth.
When it comes to interpreting these results, it is useful to consider
the range of theoretical possibilities for the growth beneﬁts associated
with ﬁnancial liberalization. At one extreme, in a standard determi-
nistic neoclassical framework, capital mobility accelerates conver-
gence but has no long-run effect on growth or the level of income.2 At
the other extreme, in an endogenous growth framework risk-
diversiﬁcation and specialization in more efﬁcient technologies can
have permanent growth-enhancing effects.3 Our ﬁndings of a
permanent level effect but no persistent growth effect seem to reject
either of these two polar views. However, they are consistent with the
notion that capital mobility raises production efﬁciency by reducing
domestic distortions.4 In particular, our empirical results can be
rationalized within a neoclassical model with imperfect competition.
In such a model, a permanent reduction in markups leads to a
temporary growth increase reﬂecting convergence towards higher
levels of capital and income.5
Until recently, most of the empirical literature studying ﬁnancial
liberalization used country-level data, and as a result was subject to
both conceptual and econometric problems. First, conceptually, if
ﬁnancial markets are not perfect within the country, the economy2 See Barro et al. (1995), and Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006).
3 See Saint-Paul (1992) and Obstfeld (1994).
4 See Tornell and Velasco (1992) and Quadrini (2005) for models in which capital
mobility reduces production inefﬁciencies associated with imperfect property rights or
time-inconsistent ﬁscal policies. In contrast, Tressel and Verdier (2007) suggest that
ﬁnancial liberalization can increase production inefﬁciencies by exacerbating the
misallocation of credit towards politically connected ﬁrms.
5 See Galí (1994, 1995) for a detailed analysis. Note that in this model, output growth
volatility tends to increase temporarily as an economy transitions from a steady-state
with a low level of capital and high markups to a steady-state with high level of capital
and low markups.does not behave like a representative agent. Indeed, there is strong
evidence that risk sharing between agents within a country is far from
complete even in the most advanced economies like the U.S.
(Attanasio and Davis, 1996; Hayashi et al., 1996). For developing
countries as well, there is a large amount of evidence, surveyed in
Banerjee and Duﬂo (2005), that the representative agent assumption
is strongly violated. When that is the case, analyzing aggregate data
may in some cases lead us to miss the most important effects of
ﬁnancial liberalization, and in others produce estimates that are not
informative about welfare implications for the average individual in
the economy (Levchenko, 2005; Broner and Ventura, 2006). The use
of sector-level data therefore enables us to get a deeper understanding
of how ﬁnancial liberalization affects the typical agent. In the last
section of the paper, we demonstrate the importance of the distinction
between industry-level and aggregate effects. In particular, while the
change in aggregate growth implied by our estimates is the same as
the industry-level change, aggregate volatility increases by much less
than sector-level volatility due to diversiﬁcation across sectors.
Second, existing cross-country results are most likely subject to
signiﬁcant endogeneity and omitted variables problems. The key
feature of our empirical approach is the variety of empirical strategies
we pursue in order to obtain reliable estimates.We isolate a number of
ﬁnancial liberalization episodes using the de jure liberalization indices
developed by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) and compare the
growth and volatility of outcomes, such as output and employment,
during the 10 years immediately before and after the liberalization
date. To address the omitted variables problem, the paper employs
two difference-in-differences strategies. The ﬁrst, more novel to this
paper, uses as the control group countries that did not liberalize in the
same period. To overcome a selection on observables problem that
could arise in such an exercise, we develop a propensity score
matching procedure to select a suitable control group for each
liberalizing country. The second approach, a more conventional one,
exploits differences in sector characteristics in the spirit of Rajan and
Zingales (1998) to identify a causal link between liberalization and
growth and volatility. As a way to assess the robustness of our results,
we also estimate the relationship between de facto measures of
ﬁnancial liberalization, such as those used by Kose et al. (2003) and
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) and growth and volatility. In spite of
important differences in the independent variables and speciﬁcations,
the ﬁndings are remarkably similar for the two types of measures.6
This paper is related to the large literature on the growth and
volatility effects of ﬁnancial liberalization, surveyed comprehensively
by Kose et al. (2006) and Henry (2007). Here, we focus on the papers
most closely related to ours. While most existing studies in this
literature use cross-country data, Galindo et al. (2002), and Gupta and
Yuan (2006) employ industry-level data and the Rajan and Zingales
(1998) methodology to analyze the effects of ﬁnancial liberalization
on growth. Our paper differs from these two contributions in several
important respects. First, we investigate the volatility effects of
ﬁnancial liberalization, doing sowithin the same empirical framework
as the growth effects. This produces a more complete picture of the
effects of ﬁnancial liberalization, and enables us to evaluate its overall
impact. Second, while the Rajan–Zingales methodology makes it
possible to identify the differential impact of ﬁnancial liberalization
across industries, it does not allow one to estimate the overall effect of
ﬁnancial liberalization. This approach is thus of limited usefulness6 The advantage of de jure measures is that they reﬂect policy levers, and thus
results based on them may have clearer policy implications for reforms that a
government might consider. Their disadvantage is that they may capture quite poorly
the actual degree of ﬁnancial integration, either because the true nature of legal
restrictions is mismeasured, or because these restrictions are imperfectly enforced.
Nonetheless, we place more weight on the de jure measures, since the de facto ones
represent equilibrium outcomes, and may be more noisy reﬂections of policy.
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By contrast, our paper proposes a methodology to measure the overall
effect. Third, we establish whether or not the effects of ﬁnancial
liberalization are temporary or permanent. And ﬁnally, we use both de
jure and de facto measures of ﬁnancial liberalization to assess
robustness of the results. In particular, de facto measures have not
previously been used in industry-level analysis.7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the data. Section 3 lays out the empirical methodology and presents
the estimating equations. Section 4 presents the results, and discusses
the implications of our sector-level estimates for aggregate growth
and volatility. Section 5 concludes.
2. Data
Industry-level production, employment, investment, and the
number of establishments come from the 2006 UNIDO Industrial
Statistics Database (United Nations Industrial Development Organiza-
tion, 2006). This paper uses the version that reports data according to
the 3-digit ISIC Revision 2 classiﬁcation for the period 1963–2003 in
the best cases. There are 28 manufacturing sectors, plus the
information on total manufacturing. We use data reported in current
U.S. dollars, and convert them into constant international dollars using
the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2002).8 The resulting dataset is
an unbalanced panel of 56 countries, but we ensure that for each
country–year we have a minimum of 10 sectors, and that for each
country, there are at least 10 years of data.
The data on de jure ﬁnancial liberalization come from Kaminsky
and Schmukler (2008) (henceforth KS), who provide indices of
liberalization in the stock market, the banking system, and freedom of
international transactions for 28 countries. Along each of the three
dimensions of liberalization, KS assign a value of 1, 2, or 3 for each
country and year, with 3 indicating the most liberalized. They also
provide a composite index, which is a mean of the three subcompo-
nents. As ameasure of de facto ﬁnancial liberalizationwe use the gross
capital ﬂows as a share of GDP. The gross capital ﬂows are the sum of
gross inﬂows and gross outﬂows, obtained from the IMF's Balance of
Payments Statistics. This measure, which is parallel to the aggregate
trade openness (exports plus imports), has been used by Kose, Prasad,
and Terrones (2003), as well as several subsequent papers.9
In order to test for the differential effect of ﬁnancial liberalization
across industries, we employ the dependence on external ﬁnance
measure introduced by Rajan and Zingales (1998). The Rajan and
Zingales measure is deﬁned as capital expenditure minus cash ﬂow,
divided by capital expenditure, and is constructed based on U.S. ﬁrm-
level data. Intuitively, it is intended to capture the share of investment
that must be ﬁnanced with funds external to the ﬁrm.10 We also make
use of the industry-level measure of liquidity needs compiled by7 A small number of studies attempt to measure the effect of ﬁnancial liberalization
by using ﬁrm-level data for several countries. Henry (2000a,b) ﬁnds that stock market
liberalizations are associated with a reduction in the cost of capital, followed by an
investment boom in a sample of listed ﬁrms in 12 emerging markets. Also using listed
ﬁrms, Mitton (2006) ﬁnds that ﬁrms with stocks that are open to foreign investors
experience higher growth, greater proﬁtability, and improved efﬁciency. Alfaro and
Charlton (2007) use a large cross-section of both listed and non-listed ﬁrms in 1999
and 2004 to show that international ﬁnancial integration fosters the entry of new
ﬁrms, a ﬁnding in line with our industry-level results.
8 Using the variable name conventions from the Penn World Tables, this deﬂation
procedure involves multiplying the nominal U.S. dollar value by (100/P)⁎(RGDPL/
CGDP) for output, and (100/P)*(KI/CI)*(RGDPL/CGDP) for investment to obtain the
deﬂated value.
9 We check the results by using instead a measure of stocks of gross foreign assets
and liabilities from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006). The results are robust to this
alternative index of de facto liberalization, and we do not report them to avoid
unnecessary repetition.
10 We use the version of the variable assembled by Klingebiel, Kroszner, and Laeven
(2007), in which industries are classiﬁed according to the 3-digit ISIC Revision 2
classiﬁcation.Raddatz (2006), deﬁned as inventories as a share of sales. A sector has
a higher need for liquidity when a smaller fraction of inventory
accumulation can be ﬁnanced by ongoing cash ﬂow. Additional
controls include ﬁnancial development – private credit as a share of
GDP – sourced from Beck et al. (2000), and trade openness at the
industry level constructed by di Giovanni and Levchenko (in press).
Appendix Table A1 lists the countries in the sample and the
summary statistics for growth, volatility, and gross capital ﬂows for
each country, as well as the means and standard deviations for the
entire sample. Table A5 in the supplementary web appendix lists the
sectors used in the analysis, along with the values of external ﬁnance
dependence and liquidity needs.
3. Empirical methodology
3.1. Baseline speciﬁcation
In the baseline approach to estimating the effects of ﬁnancial
liberalization, we date the liberalization events in a sample of
countries, and then compare outcomes before and after liberalization.
This strategy relies on the de jure indicators compiled by KS to identify
the liberalization episodes. Because we require precise liberalization
dates, we must set a threshold for the KS index, above which the
country is considered liberalized, and below which it is not.11 The
resulting set of liberalization dates is listed in Appendix Table A2.
To estimate the effects of ﬁnancial liberalization on economic
outcomes, we use a conventional difference-in-differences model. For
each liberalization episode, we compute the outcome variable, as well
as the relevant controls, for the 10-year period before, and the 10-year
period after the liberalization date. Then, for each episode, we identify
a control group of countries from among those that did not liberalize
during the 20-year period around the liberalization date. Using these,
we estimate the following set of speciﬁcations:
VOLATILITYict = β0POSTt + β1TREATEDct + γXict + Δ + eict ð1aÞ
GROWTHict = β0POSTt + β1TREATEDct + γXict + Δ + eict : ð1bÞ
Here and throughout the paper, c indexes countries, i industries,
and t time periods. On the left-hand side is either the 10-year average
growth rate of a variable (GROWTHict), or the standard deviation of
that growth rate calculated over the 10 year span (VOLATILITYict).
Model (1) is the “classic” difference-in-differences speciﬁcation. The
left-hand side variable is measured in two periods, before and after
treatment. Thus, by construction, in this model t takes on only two
values: before liberalization, and after it. The variable POSTt takes on
the value of 0 before the liberalization episode, and 1 after. It is
common to both treated and control observations. Finally, the
coefﬁcient of interest β1 is on the variable TREATEDct, which is a
binary indicator for whether a country is liberalized in a given period.
Intuitively, while the familiar Rajan–Zingales-type model uses non-
ﬁnancially intensive sectors as a control group for the ﬁnancially
intensive sectors, this empirical strategy uses non-liberalizing
countries as a control group for the liberalizing country.
The vector of controls Xict contains the beginning-of-period share
of the sector in total output, as well as exports and imports as a share
of output in the sector.12 In addition, Xict includes a measure of11 Whenever the ﬁnancial liberalization index used is not binary, an important
question is how to deﬁne a ﬁnancial liberalization event. In the baseline regressions we
classify a country as liberalized whenever all three components of the index —
domestic, capital account, and stock market — indicate full liberalization. This
approach emphasizes the complementarities between the different ﬁnancial liberal-
ization reforms.
12 We use beginning-of-period values rather than period averages for share to avoid
inducing a mechanical correlation with the left-hand side variable: a faster-growing
sector will tend to have higher share in the contemporaneous period.
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interaction between the country'sﬁnancial development and theRajan–
Zingalesmeasure of dependenceon externalﬁnance. These aremeant to
control for the well-documented differential growth effects of ﬁnancial
development. Raddatz (2006)ﬁnds that volatility in a sector responds to
ﬁnancial development differentially depending on its liquidity needs. In
the volatility speciﬁcations we thus control for this effect, by including
instead the interaction between ﬁnancial development and liquidity
needs. Appendix Table A3 presents the correlation matrix for the
independent variables. Both speciﬁcations include a set of ﬁxed effects
Δ. The ability to employ a variety of ﬁxed effects is a major strength of
our empirical approach, as these canpotentially control for awide range
of omitted variables. The use of ﬁxed effects becomes especially
powerful in a three-dimensional panel, which makes it possible to use
interacted effects, such as country×sector, or sector×time.
The key question iswhat countries to assign to the control group for
each liberalization episode. This paper pursues two strategies. First, for
each episode we use as the control group all of the countries that did
not liberalize around the same time as the liberalizing country. This
procedure can result in a large number of heterogeneous countries
constituting each control group. To reﬁne this procedure one step, we
only use OECD countries as available controls for the OECD liberalizers,
and non-OECD countries as possible controls for the non-OECD
liberalizers. The advantage of this approach is that it uses a large
amount of information for what is happening in various non-liberal-
izing countries around the time of each liberalization episode. The
disadvantage is that besides the coarse OECD/non-OECD reﬁnement,
no attempt ismade to use country characteristics in picking the control
groups. Potentially, this can result in the control group countries
having very different characteristics from the treated ones for each
episode. Note that the large size of the control groups should help in
this respect, since the country heterogeneity would be averaged out
among the large number of control countries. Also, many of the
obvious differences, such as the overall level of development, which
can arise between a treated country and its control, would be
accounted for by the country ﬁxed effects included in the estimation.
Nonetheless, potential selection concerns remain. In order to
overcome them, we also employ a propensity score matching
procedure (henceforth PSM) to ﬁnd a suitable control group. The
supplementary web appendix to this paper describes it in detail. The
PSM procedure seeks to use information on observable characteristics
of subjects to estimate a probability model for being treated. Then, for
each instance of a treated observation, it uses the information on the
observables to identify a non-treated observation closest to the
treated one. That non-treated observation then becomes the control
group for the treated one. The ﬁrst economic applications of the
propensity score techniques are due to Dehejia and Wahba (1999,
2002), while in international economics they were ﬁrst used by
Persson (2001) and Glick, Guo and Hutchinson (2006). Though it has
been applied widely in various empirical analyses, it must be kept in
mind that the PSM method corrects only for selection on observables,
not unobservables. Furthermore, it can be sensitive to the set of
conditioning variables used to predict propensity scores (see Smith
and Todd, 2005).
3.2. Alternative estimation strategies
Because the ﬁnancial liberalization variable varies at the coun-
try×time level, in the baseline empirical model we cannot include
country×time effects that would capture any other time-varying
country characteristics not picked up by the controls. An alternative
approach is to exploit sector-level characteristics in the spirit of Rajan
and Zingales (1998) to identify a causal relationship between ﬁnancial
liberalization and outcomes. We rely on the variation in the
dependence on external ﬁnance introduced by Rajan and Zingales
(1998), as well as the liquidity needsmeasure from Raddatz (2006). Inparticular, we estimate the following speciﬁcations on the sample of
liberalizing countries:
VOLATILITYict = βCHARi⁎TREATEDct + γXict + δct + δi + eict ð2aÞ
GROWTHict = βCHARi⁎TREATEDct + γXict + δct + δi + eict ; ð2bÞ
where c indexes countries, i industries, and t time periods. Same as
above, GROWTHict and VOLATILITYict are the average growth rates
over the 10-year period, and the standard deviation of the growth rate
over the same period, respectively. TREATEDct is deﬁned identically to
the above speciﬁcation: it is zero except in the post-liberalization
period for the country that liberalized. CHARi refers to the industry
characteristic used in estimation. This characteristic is either the Rajan
and Zingales measure of dependence on external ﬁnance, or the
Raddatz measure of liquidity needs. Xict is a vector of controls. All of
the speciﬁcations include a full set of country×time effects δct, as well
as sector effects δi. Thus, in this model we identify the effect of
ﬁnancial liberalization purely from the differential effects across
industries within a country. The Rajan and Zingales-type approach is a
common one in the literature, indeed we are not the ﬁrst to analyze
the growth effects of ﬁnancial liberalizationwith this strategy (though
we are the ﬁrst, to our knowledge, to address the issue of volatility).
It is important to emphasize thepros and cons ofmodel (1) compared
to (2). The disadvantage of the former is that it may suffer from an
omitted variables problem, because of our inability to include coun-
try×time effects. Its main advantage is that it allows us to estimate the
direct effect of ﬁnancial liberalization on the average growth and
volatility across sectors within a country. By contrast, the omitted
variables problem is overcome in the Rajan–Zingales-type model.
However, its key shortcoming is that because it relies solely on the
within-country cross-industry variation, it does not allow the researcher
to identify themagnitude of the overall effect. That is, the growth effect of
ﬁnancial liberalization– theobject ofmuch studyusing the cross-country
regression approach – is subsumed in the country×time ﬁxed effect.
To further check robustness of the results to alternative measures
of ﬁnancial liberalization, we estimate an empirical model based on de
facto indices rather than de jure ones:
VOLATILITYict = βFINOPENct + γXict + Δ + eict ð3aÞ
GROWTHict = βFINOPENct + γXict + Δ + eict : ð3bÞ
The sample is a non-overlapping panel of 10-year averages, 1970–
79, 1980–89, 1990–99, thus the subscript t refers to decades. The
variable of interest, FINOPENct, is the gross capital ﬂows as a share of
GDP (see Kose et al. 2003). Finally, we also consider a Rajan–Zingales-
type difference-in-differences panel speciﬁcation in which the de
facto measure of ﬁnancial integration, FINOPENct, is interacted with
industry characteristics.
4. Results
4.1. Volatility and growth
We now discuss the results of estimating the baseline model (1).
Table 1 reports the estimates of the relationship between ﬁnancial
liberalization and volatility of output. The ﬁrst four columns use the
full control group, while the last four use the PSM group. As we cannot
use country×time effects, we experiment with various conﬁgurations
of ﬁxed effects to control for omitted variables. Column 1 presents
estimation results with country ﬁxed effects, while column 2 uses
country×sector ﬁxed effects. Column 3 uses country and group×time
ﬁxed effects, where we deﬁne a “group” to be a single liberalizing
country plus all its control countries. The group×time effects control
for the time variation in the variables affecting both the treated and
the control countries, such as the changes in the global conditions.
Table 1
Difference-in-differences results based on control countries, volatility.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var.: standard deviation of the growth rate of output
Treated 0.022⁎⁎ 0.021 0.015⁎⁎ 0.022⁎⁎ 0.022⁎⁎ 0.022⁎⁎ 0.024⁎⁎⁎ 0.023⁎
[0.009] [0.014] [0.006] [0.009] [0.011] [0.011] [0.006] [0.013]
Post −0.002 −0.001 0.013 −0.001 −0.005 −0.004 0.034⁎⁎⁎ −0.003
[0.007] [0.011] [0.013] [0.007] [0.016] [0.017] [0.012] [0.020]
Exports/output 0.030⁎⁎⁎ 0.016 0.030⁎⁎⁎ 0.016⁎⁎⁎ 0.021⁎⁎⁎ 0.016⁎⁎ 0.021⁎⁎⁎ 0.008
[0.005] [0.015] [0.005] [0.005] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008] [0.007]
Imports/output 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
Initial share −0.281⁎⁎⁎ −0.888⁎⁎⁎ −0.282⁎⁎⁎ −0.250⁎⁎⁎ −0.234⁎⁎⁎ −0.445⁎ −0.235⁎⁎⁎ −0.103
[0.026] [0.216] [0.026] [0.059] [0.047] [0.259] [0.047] [0.092]
Private credit −0.016 −0.124⁎⁎ −0.073⁎⁎ −0.069⁎ 0 −0.027 −0.017 −0.017
[0.037] [0.062] [0.037] [0.041] [0.092] [0.109] [0.060] [0.118]
Private credit⁎Liq. needs −0.089 0.617 −0.088 0.258⁎ −0.067 0.099 −0.062 0.03
[0.057] [0.397] [0.057] [0.131] [0.072] [0.383] [0.072] [0.245]
Country FE Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country⁎Sector FE No Yes No No No Yes No No
Group⁎Time FE No No Yes No No No Yes No
Group⁎Sector FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
Control group All All All All PSM PSM PSM PSM
Observations 3789 3789 3789 3789 1738 1738 1738 1738
R-squared 0.28 0.71 0.29 0.48 0.3 0.72 0.33 0.57
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at country⁎time level in brackets; ⁎ signiﬁcant at 10%; ⁎⁎ signiﬁcant at 5%; ⁎⁎⁎ signiﬁcant at 1%. The dependent variable is the standard
deviation of the growth rate of output during the 10 years immediately before or immediately after an episode of ﬁnancial liberalization. Treated takes on the value of 1 if a
liberalization event took place in a country, and zero otherwise. Post takes on the value of zero before the liberalization event, and 1 after, for all countries irrespective of whether they
liberalized. Initial share is the beginning-of-period share of output in a sector in total manufacturing output. Exports/output and Imports/output are the exports and the imports in the
sector divided by the total output in the sector. Private credit is the private credit by banks and other ﬁnancial institutions as a share of GDP. Liq. needs is the sector-level measure of
liquidity needs. In the ﬁrst 4 columns the control group consists of all countries (within the group of OECD/non-OECD) that did not liberalize within the 20-year period. In the last
four columns the control group is the country selected by the propensity score matching procedure (PSM). All speciﬁcations are estimated using OLS, and including the ﬁxed effects
speciﬁed in the table. Variable deﬁnitions and sources are described in detail in the text.
13 Column 1 includes country, sector, and time effects separately. Column 2 uses
instead country and sector×time ﬁxed effects. Column 3 adds country×sector and
time effects. Note that in this column, identiﬁcation comes purely from the time series
variation in the variables of interest. Column 4 includes country×sector and
sector×time ﬁxed effects. This is the most stringent possible array of ﬁxed effects
(in terms of remaining degrees of freedom) that can be included in this speciﬁcation.
The only difference between the volatility and the growth speciﬁcations is that Eq. (3a)
interacts private credit with the Raddatz measure of liquidity needs, while Eq. (3b)
interacts private credit with the Rajan and Zingales measure of external ﬁnance
dependence instead. This difference in the control variables does not affect the results.
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latter is the same as using sector ﬁxed effects, but within each
individual group (as, for example, the sector effects may change over
time). Because ﬁnancial liberalization occurs at country×time level,
we cluster the standard errors at country×time level as well, in order
to avoid biasing the standard errors downwards.
Financial liberalization appears to increase volatility, as the
coefﬁcients of interest with both the full and the PSM control groups
are positive and signiﬁcant in all but one case. The coefﬁcient is stable
across the control groups and ﬁxed effects conﬁgurations. It implies
that a ﬁnancial liberalization event is associated with a rise in the
standard deviation of sectoral growth of 1.5–2.4 percentage points, or
about 0.13–0.21 standard deviations of volatility found in the sample.
Table 2 reports the results of estimating Eq. (1b), with the average
growth rate of output over the 10-year period as the dependent variable.
Once again, the ﬁrst four columns use all available countries as control
groups,while the last four report the resultswith the PSMcontrol group.
The columns differ in their use of ﬁxed effects, identically to the
estimates of the volatility effect of ﬁnancial liberalization in Table 1.
We can see thatﬁnancial liberalization has a robust positive effect on
growth of output across sectors. This effect is present across all conﬁg-
urations of ﬁxed effects except one. Using the PSM control group, the
coefﬁcient is signiﬁcant at 1% in all cases. The magnitude of the effect is
large. A ﬁnancial liberalization, captured by moving the TREATED
variable from 0 to 1, is associated with a sector-level growth rate that is
between1.5 (full control group) and3.5 (PSMcontrol group)percentage
points higher. This is equivalent to 0.17 and 0.40 of a standard deviation
of the 10-year average sector-level growth rate observed in the sample.
Among the other controls, themost signiﬁcant one is the initial share
in total output, which has a negative sign in both the volatility and
growth speciﬁcations. We interpret this as a standard convergence
effect: sectors that are already large and established experience less
growth in the subsequent period. Trade openness and ﬁnancial
development on its own do not appear to be robustly signiﬁcant. The
Rajan–Zingales term – private credit interacted with external ﬁnance
dependence – has a signiﬁcant impact on growth inmost speciﬁcations,as has been extensively documented. By contrast, the interaction
between ﬁnancial development and the Raddatz measure of liquidity
needsdoesnot appear tohave a robust impactonvolatility in our sample.
We next discuss the results of the two alternative estimation
strategies laid out above. First, we employ an alternative difference-in-
differences model based on sector characteristics, models (2a) and
(2b). Results are presented in Table 3. We can see that within
countries, sectors that rely more on external ﬁnance tend to grow
faster. In addition, sectors that rely on external ﬁnance, as well as
sectors with greater liquidity needs tend to become more volatile as a
result of ﬁnancial liberalization.
The second alternative strategy,model (3), uses de factomeasures of
ﬁnancial liberalization instead of de jure ones. Table 4 reports the results
of estimating Eq. (3a), in which the dependent variable is the standard
deviation of the growth rate of output over the 10-year period, while
Table 5 reports the results of estimating the impact of ﬁnancial
liberalization on growth, Eq. (3b). Unless otherwise indicated, we use
the same speciﬁcations, controls, and conﬁgurations of ﬁxed effects
throughout for maximum comparability. The independent variable of
interest, FINOPEN, is the average gross capital ﬂows over the same 10-
year period. Because FINOPEN is measured at country×time level, we
cluster the standard errors at the country×time level as well. The ﬁrst
four columns add progressively more ﬁxed effects.13
FINOPEN has a positive effect on volatility for all conﬁgurations of
ﬁxed effects, though the level of signiﬁcance is at 10% in most
speciﬁcations. The magnitude of the impact of FINOPEN on volatility is
Table 3
Difference-in-differences results based on industry characters.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Output
Growth Volatility
Extern. ﬁn⁎Treated 0.016⁎ 0.024⁎
[0.010] [0.015]
Liq. needs⁎Treated 0.100 0.158⁎
[0.067] [0.097]
Exports/output 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.008
[0.005] [0.005] [0.011] [0.011]
Imports/output −0.004⁎⁎ −0.004⁎⁎ −0.001 −0.001
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]
Initial share −0.109⁎ −0.113⁎ −0.332⁎⁎⁎ −0.329⁎⁎⁎
[0.066] [0.064] [0.105] [0.103]
Private credit⁎Extern. ﬁn 0.005 0.031
[0.020] [0.029]
Private credit⁎Liq. needs 0.237 0.316
[0.152] [0.202]
Country⁎Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 852 852 851 851
R-squared 0.55 0.55 0.46 0.46
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; ⁎ signiﬁcant at 10%; ⁎⁎ signiﬁcant at 5%;
⁎⁎⁎ signiﬁcant at 1%. The dependent variable is the average growth rate, or the standard
Table 2
Difference-in-difference results based on control countries, growth.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. var.: growth rate of output
Treated 0.015⁎ 0.151 0.015⁎⁎ 0.016⁎⁎⁎ 0.034⁎⁎⁎ 0.035⁎⁎⁎ 0.025⁎⁎⁎ 0.035⁎⁎⁎
[0.008] [0.013] [0.006] [0.009] [0.008] [0.013] [0.006] [0.0010]
Post −0.012⁎⁎⁎ −0.011⁎ −0.003 −0.013⁎⁎⁎ −0.021⁎⁎⁎ −0.021⁎ −0.007⁎ −0.021⁎⁎
[0.004] [0.006] [0.002] [0.004] [0.007] [0.011] [0.004] [0.009]
Exports/output −0.004 −0.013⁎⁎ −0.004 −0.004 0.003 −0.004 0.003 0.004
[0.004] [0.006] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.013] [0.005] 0.006]
Imports/output 0 −0.001 0 0 −0.004⁎ −0.003 −0.005 −0.005⁎
[0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0..002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.033]
Initial share 0.053⁎⁎⁎ 1.553⁎⁎⁎ 0.054⁎⁎⁎ 0.218⁎⁎⁎ −0.036 −1.598 −0.038 −0.191
[0.019] [0.146] [0.019] [0.041] [0.030] [0.205] [0.030] [0.072]
Private credit 0.026 −0.006 −0.028⁎ 0.039⁎ 0.051 −0.091 0.011 0.055
[0.018] [0.029] [0.017] [0.020] [0.039] [0.058] [0.034] [0.049]
Private credit⁎Extern. ﬁn 0.053⁎⁎⁎ 0.176⁎⁎⁎ 0.052⁎⁎⁎ 0.007 0.059⁎⁎⁎ 0.182⁎⁎⁎ 0.059⁎⁎⁎ 0.053⁎⁎
[0.005] [0.016] [0.005] [0.016] [0.007] [0.027] [0.007] [0.026]
Country FE Yes No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country⁎sector FE No Yes No No No Yes No No
Group⁎ time FE No No Yes No No No Yes No
Group⁎sector FE No No No Yes No No No Yes
Control group All All All All PSM PSM PSM PSM
Observations 3799 3799 3799 3799 1738 1738 1738 1738
R-squared 0.35 0.75 0.39 0.5 0.43 0.79 0.47 0.63
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at country⁎ time level in brackets; ⁎ Signiﬁcant at 10%; ⁎⁎ signiﬁcant at 5%; ⁎⁎⁎ signiﬁcant at 1%. The dependent variable is the average growth
rate of output during the 10 years immediately before or immediately after an episode of ﬁnancial liberalization. Treated takes on the value of 1 if a liberalization event took place in a
country, and zero otherwise. Post takes on the value of zero before the liberalization event, and 1 after, for all countries irrespective of whether they liberalized. Initial share is the
beginning-of-period share of output in a sector in total manufacturing output. Exports/output and Imports/output are the exports and the imports in the sector divided by the total
output in the sector. Private credit is the private credit by banks and other ﬁnancial institutions as a share of GDP. Extern. ﬁn. is the sector-level measure of reliance on external ﬁnance.
In the ﬁrst 4 columns the control group consists of all countries (within the group of OECD/non-OECD) that did not liberalize within the 20-year period. In the last four columns the
control group is the country selected by the propensity score matching procedure (PSM). All speciﬁcations are estimated using OLS, and including the ﬁxed effects speciﬁed in the
table. Variable deﬁnitions and sources are described in detail in the text.
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associated with a rise in the standard deviation of sector-level growth
rate of 1.6 percentage points, equivalent to amovement of 0.13 standard
deviations of the sectoral volatility in the sample. From Table 5, it is
evident that the ﬁnancial openness variable also has a positive effect on
the growth rate of total output. The magnitude of the coefﬁcient of
interest is economically signiﬁcant. A one standard deviation change in
de facto ﬁnancial openness is associated with a 1.3 percentage points
increase in the output growth rate, a change of 0.16 standard deviations.
Finally, columns 5 and 6 of Tables 4 and 5 interact FINOPENwith the
Rajan and Zingalesmeasure of dependence on externalﬁnance and the
Raddatz measure of liquidity needs. We include country×time ﬁxed
effects, controlling for other changes – such as reforms – that occur at
country level and differ across time. Note that this makes it impossible
to estimate the effect of FINOPENonvolatility or growth, but enables us
tomake a statement about its differential impact across sectors. Higher
levels of FINOPEN increase volatilitymore in sectors that dependmore
on external ﬁnance, or with higher liquidity needs. When it comes to
growth effects, it does appear to be the case that more ﬁnancially
dependent sectors grow faster as a result of liberalization than less
ﬁnancially dependent sectors. We do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant differential
growth effect for sectors with higher liquidity needs.
In sum, the estimates using the de jure and de facto measures
ﬁnancial integration yield strikingly similar results. Both reveal that
ﬁnancial liberalization increases both growth and volatility. Both
effects are magniﬁed in sectors that are more dependent of external
ﬁnance, suggesting that those sectors are growing faster in part thanks
to higher leverage in the post-liberalization period.14 When it comes14 How do our volatility results compare to the existing estimates? The literature
using cross-country data has focused on the volatility of aggregate consumption rather
than output. Even for aggregate consumption, the results are inconclusive: while Kose
et al. (2003) ﬁnd, paradoxically, that ﬁnancial integration increases consumption
volatility, Bekaert et al. (2006) ﬁnd the opposite. Glick et al. (2006) demonstrate that
ﬁnancial integration reduces the likelihood of currency crises. However, these results
are not directly comparable to ours, as currency crises are a different object than the
year-on-year volatility studied here.to magnitudes, the impact of a de jure liberalization on both growth
and volatility is larger than that of increasing de facto capital ﬂows by
one standard deviation. The two measures of ﬁnancial liberalizationdeviation of the growth rate of output during the 10 years immediately before or
immediately after an episode of ﬁnancial liberalization. Treated takes on the value of 1 if
a liberalization event took place, and zero otherwise. Private credit is the private credit
by banks and other ﬁnancial institutions as a share of GDP. Extern. ﬁn. is the sector-level
measure of reliance on external ﬁnance. Liq. needs is the sector-level measure of
liquidity needs. Initial share is the beginning-of-period share of output in a sector in
total manufacturing output. Exports/output and Imports/output are the exports and the
imports in the sector divided by the total output in the sector. All speciﬁcations are
estimated using OLS, and including country⁎ time and sector ﬁxed effects. Variable
deﬁnitions and sources are described in detail in the text.
Table 4
De facto ﬁnancial liberalization and volatility, 10-year panel estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var.: standard deviation of the growth rate of output
FINOPEN 0.266⁎⁎ 0.271⁎⁎ 0.269⁎ 0.277⁎
[0.108] [0.109] [0.147] [0.149]
Extern. ﬁn⁎FINOPEN 0.164⁎⁎
[0.081]
Liq. needs⁎FINOPEN 1.836⁎⁎⁎
[0.598]
Log(Output/worker) −0.021⁎⁎⁎ −0.021⁎⁎⁎ −0.021 −0.023 −0.020⁎⁎⁎ −0.020⁎⁎⁎
[0.005] [0.005] [0.013] [0.014] [0.005] [0.005]
Initial share −0.283⁎⁎⁎ −0.282⁎⁎⁎ −0.289⁎ −0.335⁎⁎ −0.288⁎⁎⁎ −0.280⁎⁎⁎
[0.041] [0.042] [0.147] [0.166] [0.042] [0.042]
Exports/output 0.005 −0.018 −0.145 −0.211 −0.043 −0.039
[0.124] [0.120] [0.210] [0.211] [0.128] [0.129]
Imports/output −0.005 0.000 0.005 0.016 0.000 −0.001
[0.025] [0.024] [0.031] [0.031] [0.025] [0.025]
Private credit 0.007 0.014 −0.067 0.011
[0.048] [0.047] [0.080] [0.093]
Private credit⁎Liq. needs −0.08 −0.128 0.38 −0.1 −0.330⁎⁎
[0.160] [0.155] [0.410] [0.525] [0.148]
Private credit⁎Extern. ﬁn −0.006
[0.020]
Country FE Yes Yes No No No No
Sector FE Yes No No No No No
Time FE Yes No Yes No No No
Country⁎sector FE No No Yes Yes No No
Sector⁎Time FE No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Country⁎Time FE No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 3761 3761 3761 3761 3761 3761
R-squared 0.39 0.41 0.65 0.66 0.48 0.48
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; standard errors are clustered at country-time level in columns (1)–(4); ⁎ signiﬁcant at 10%; ⁎⁎ signiﬁcant at 5%; ⁎⁎⁎ signiﬁcant at 1%. The
sample is a panel of three decades, 1970–79, 1980–89 and 1990–99; all of the variables are 10-year averages unless otherwise indicated. The dependent variable is the standard
deviation of the growth rate of output over the 10-year period. FINOPEN is gross capital ﬂows, deﬁned as the absolute value of total inﬂows plus the absolute value of total outﬂows, as
a share of GDP. Log(Initial output/worker) is the log of output per worker in a sector. Initial share is the beginning-of-period share of output in a sector in total manufacturing output.
Exports/output and Imports/output are the exports and the imports in the sector divided by the total output in the sector. Private credit is the private credit by banks and other
ﬁnancial institutions as a share of GDP. Extern. ﬁn. is the sector-level measure of reliance on external ﬁnance. Liq. needs is the sector-level measure of liquidity needs. All speciﬁcations
are estimated using OLS, and including the ﬁxed effects speciﬁed in the table. Variable deﬁnitions and sources are described in detail in the text.
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typical de jure episode we analyze is equivalent to a more than one
standard deviation change in de facto openness.
Our difference-in-differences approach that uses the de jure
indicators requires a precise dating of ﬁnancial liberalization reforms.
Because of this, we transform the KS measure into a binary indicator
and thus overlook the gradual nature of the ﬁnancial liberalization
process. As a robustness check, we used the original KS index in place
of FINOPEN in the panel speciﬁcation model (3)).15 Table A6 in the
supplementary web appendix shows that our results are robust to this
alternative estimation strategy.
4.2. Factor accumulation vs. total factor productivity growth
We next investigate the channels through which ﬁnancial liberal-
ization increases the growth rate of output. We would like to know
whether it is associated with greater entry (the number of ﬁrms).
Furthermore, as in a standard growth accounting framework, growth
in total production can come from increased employment, capital
accumulation, and growth in total factor productivity (TFP). We use
the standard techniques to construct the capital stock and a TFP series
for each country and sector (see, for example, Hall and Jones, 1999).
The capital stock in each year t is given by Kict=(1−δ)Kict−1+ Iict,
where Iict denotes investment. We take a depreciation rate δ=0.08,
and adopt the standard assumption that the initial level of capital
stock is equal to Iic0/δ. We then follow Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000) to
compute total factor productivity at the industry level. Log of TFP in15 The original KS index varies from 1 (no liberalization in any dimension) to 3 (full
liberalization in all dimensions).year t is equal to lnTFPict=lnYict−(1−αic)lnLict−αiclnKict, where Yict
is the total output, and Lict is the total employment in the sector. Each
sector in each country has its own labor share αic, computed as the
average of the total wage bill divided by value added.16
Table 6 investigates the impact of ﬁnancial liberalization on each of
these components of overall growth. We estimate Eq. (1b) with the
growth rate in the number of establishments, employment, capital
accumulation, and TFP as dependent variables. For each of these, we
report results with both the full and PSM control groups. All of the
speciﬁcations are presented only with country and group×time ﬁxed
effects, though the results are robust across the various ﬁxed effects
conﬁgurations. Columns 1 and 2 use the growth rate in the number of
establishments as the dependent variable. The evidence here is mixed.
While the full control group sample produces zero effect, when we
select the control group with the PSM procedure, it turns out that the
effect of ﬁnancial liberalization on entry is strongly positive. Columns
3 and 4 show that the growth rate of sector-level employment
increases signiﬁcantly with ﬁnancial liberalization. Columns 5 and 6
investigate the impact of ﬁnancial liberalization on capital accumula-
tion. The effect is positive and robustly signiﬁcant. Finally, there does
not appear to be a robust positive effect of ﬁnancial liberalization on
TFP. In one of the speciﬁcations it is not signiﬁcant, while in the other
there is a positive and marginally signiﬁcant coefﬁcient.
We estimated the impact of ﬁnancial liberalization on the channels
for growth in two additional ways. First, we used the Rajan–Zingales
identiﬁcation strategy in model (2). Second, we used the de facto16 Alternatively, we applied to all countries the labor share in sector i in the U.S., or
the average labor share in sector i across all countries in the sample. We also used labor
productivity (value added per worker) instead of TFP. The results were unchanged.
Table 5
De facto ﬁnancial liberalization and growth, 10-year panel estimates.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. var.: growth rate of output
FINOPEN 0.260⁎⁎⁎ 0.259⁎⁎⁎ 0.282⁎⁎⁎ 0.286⁎⁎⁎
[0.066] [0.066] [0.092] [0.091]
FINOPEN⁎Extern. ﬁn. 0.187⁎⁎⁎
[0.061]
FINOPEN⁎Liq. needs 0.445
[0.411]
Log(Initial output/worker) −0.015⁎⁎⁎ −0.014⁎⁎⁎ −0.036⁎⁎⁎ −0.036⁎⁎⁎ −0.013⁎⁎⁎ −0.013⁎⁎⁎
[0.004] [0.004] [0.008] [0.008] [0.004] [0.004]
Initial share −0.100⁎⁎⁎ −0.098⁎⁎⁎ −0.641⁎⁎⁎ −0.738⁎⁎⁎ −0.100⁎⁎⁎ −0.092⁎⁎⁎
[0.028] [0.029] [0.118] [0.128] [0.029] [0.029]
Exports/output 0.001 0.002 −0.142 −0.160 0.020 0.036
[0.140] [0.137] [0.258] [0.266] [0.124] [0.124]
Imports/output −0.021 −0.019 0.004 0.009 −0.027 −0.029
[0.024] [0.024] [0.035] [0.035] [0.021] [0.021]
Private credit 0.008 0.01 −0.003 −0.005
[0.029] [0.029] [0.042] [0.044]
Private Credit⁎Extern. ﬁn 0.036⁎⁎ 0.038⁎⁎ 0.096 0.112 0.017
[0.017] [0.017] [0.062] [0.076] [0.015]
Private credit⁎Liq. needs 0.078
[0.111]
Country FE Yes Yes No No No No
Sector FE Yes No No No No No
Time FE Yes No Yes No No No
Country⁎sector FE No No Yes Yes No No
Sector⁎ time FE No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Country⁎ time FE No No No No Yes Yes
Observations 3777 3777 3777 3777 3777 3777
R-squared 0.31 0.33 0.57 0.59 0.41 0.41
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; standard errors are clustered at country⁎ time level in columns (1)–(4); ⁎ signiﬁcant at 10%; ⁎⁎ signiﬁcant at 5%; ⁎⁎⁎ signiﬁcant at 1%. The
sample is a panel of three decades, 1970–79, 1980–89 and 1990–99; all of the variables are 10-year averages, unless otherwise indicated. The dependent variable is the growth rate of
output. FINOPEN is gross capital ﬂows, deﬁned as the absolute value of total inﬂows plus the absolute value of total outﬂows as a share of GDP. Log(Initial output/worker) is the log of
beginning-of-period output per worker in a sector. Initial share is the beginning-of-period share of output in a sector in total manufacturing output. Exports/output and Imports/
output are the exports and the imports in the sector divided by the total output in the sector. Private credit is the private credit by banks and other ﬁnancial institutions as a share of
GDP. Extern. ﬁn. is the sector-level measure of reliance on external ﬁnance. Liq. needs is the sector-level measure of liquidity needs. All speciﬁcations are estimated using OLS, and
including the ﬁxed effects speciﬁed in the table. Variable deﬁnitions and sources are described in detail in the text.
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subcomponent of growth. In addition, we combined the Rajan–
Zingales strategy with de facto indices. The results are reported in
Tables A7 and A8 of the supplementary web appendix to this paper.
They conﬁrm our conclusions regarding the channels for the growth
impact of ﬁnancial liberalization: there is a robust effect on employ-
ment and capital accumulation, and suggestive evidence of increased
entry. However, by and large there is no robust impact of ﬁnancial
liberalization on TFP growth.17
4.3. Temporary vs. permanent effects
This paper uses a variety of empirical strategies to document the
effect of ﬁnancial liberalization on growth, volatility, and the various
subcomponents of output at a 10-year horizon. Going much beyond
10 years would be impractical, as there aren't many liberalization
episodes in the sample that occurred more than 10 years before our
data ends. However, we can still investigate whether themagnitude of
the effect of ﬁnancial liberalization changes over time. This will allow
us to establish whether the impact of liberalization on various
outcomes is short-lived, or has a chance to be long-lasting.17 We do not report here the decomposition of the volatility results into channels as
we did with the growth results. While in growth accounting the growth rates of each
component of the production function add up to the total, the volatilities of the
subcomponents do not add up to the volatility of the total because of the covariances
among the subcomponents. Thus, it is not as informative to report the effect of
ﬁnancial liberalization on each subcomponent, and may be misleading as to what is
responsible for the overall effect if the covariances are also changing. Results are
nevertheless available upon request.In this section, we break the post-liberalization periods into 3-year
intervals: 0–2, 3–5, 6–8, and 9–11 years, and use the difference-in-
differences model (1) with the PSM control group to estimate the
treatment effect (β1) for each 3-year period after liberalization.
Examining these coefﬁcients will tell us at which lag the effect of
ﬁnancial liberalization is at its strongest. Fig. 2 presents the results. It
plots β1 over time, along with the 90% conﬁdence intervals.
The left panel of Fig. 2 presents the timing of the growth effects. It
is clear that the positive effect of ﬁnancial liberalization occurs early in
the sample: the ﬁrst 6 years. At longer lags, the effect of ﬁnancial
liberalization on growth becomes muted and not statistically
signiﬁcant. The time pattern also indicates that the growth effect in
the post-liberalization period is highly non-stationary: growth rises
on impact, accelerates further 3 to 5 years after liberalization, and then
decelerates to reach zero at the end of the 12 year period. An
interesting question is how much of the increase in growth volatility
within 10 years found in Section 4.1 is due to the non-stationarity of
the growth transition. To measure this, we compute the increase in
growth volatility implied by the time evolution of the growth effects.
We ﬁnd that it amounts to 1.8%, a ﬁgure only slightly lower than the
average post-liberalization effect for volatility in the 10 year window
presented in Table 1 (2.22%).
The right panel of Fig. 2 presents the timing of the volatility effects.
Note that we measure the impact of ﬁnancial liberalization on short-
run growth volatility within each 3-year interval, abstracting from the
impact of change in growth between intervals discussed above. We
ﬁnd that the growth volatility experiences a sharp increase in the
immediate aftermath of ﬁnancial liberalization. This effect is reduced
over time but remains positive. In the last interval — 9–11 years — the
effect on volatility is equal to 1.7%, though it is not statistically
different from zero (P-value of 15.6%). Therefore, we cannot
Table 6
Difference-in-differences results based on control countries, channels.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of establishments Employment Capital accumulation Total factor productivity
Treated 0.006 0.028⁎⁎⁎ 0.011⁎⁎ 0.023⁎⁎⁎ 0.018⁎ 0.040⁎⁎⁎ 0.010⁎ 0.000
[0.009] [0.007] [0.005] [0.005] [0.011] [0.011] [0.006] [0.006]
Post −0.084⁎⁎⁎ −0.018⁎⁎⁎ −0.054⁎⁎⁎ −0.050⁎⁎⁎ 0.023⁎⁎ −0.061⁎⁎⁎ −0.008 0.002
[0.027] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.011] [0.009] [0.006] [0.008]
Exports/output −0.003 0.011⁎ 0.007⁎ 0.004 0.003 −0.002 −0.003 0.000
[0.003] [0.006] [0.004] [0.004] [0.003] [0.005] [0.003] [0.003]
Imports/output 0.000 −0.003⁎⁎ −0.001⁎⁎⁎ −0.003 0.000 0.002 0.000 −0.005⁎⁎⁎
[0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.001]
Initial share −0.023 −0.044 −0.049⁎⁎⁎ −0.031 0.048⁎⁎⁎ 0.049⁎⁎⁎ −0.056⁎⁎⁎ −0.060⁎⁎
[0.014] [0.026] [0.018] [0.019] [0.014] [0.018] [0.013] [0.023]
Private credit 0.124 0.092 −0.019 −0.018 0.033 0.057 −0.068⁎⁎⁎ −0.065
[0.078] [0.056] [0.015] [0.033] [0.027] [0.068] [0.017] [0.039]
Private credit⁎Extern. ﬁn 0.045⁎⁎⁎ 0.049⁎⁎⁎ 0.048⁎⁎⁎ 0.055⁎⁎⁎ 0.048⁎⁎⁎ 0.060⁎⁎⁎ 0.007⁎⁎⁎ 0.002
[0.005] [0.006] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [0.005] [0.002] [0.003]
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Group⁎Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control group All PSM All PSM All PSM All PSM
Observations 2870 1510 3839 1764 3287 1539 3267 1536
R-squared 0.42 0.47 0.4 0.48 0.58 0.65 0.24 0.2
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at country⁎ time level in brackets; ⁎ signiﬁcant at 10%; ⁎⁎ signiﬁcant at 5%; ⁎⁎⁎ signiﬁcant at 1%. The dependent variable is the average growth
rate of the number of establishments, total employment, capital stock, and TFP during the 10 years immediately before or immediately after an episode of ﬁnancial liberalization.
Treated takes on the value of 1 if a liberalization event took place in a country, and zero otherwise. Post takes on the value of zero before the liberalization event, and 1 after, for all
countries irrespective of whether they liberalized. Initial share is the beginning-of-period share of output in a sector in total manufacturing output. Exports/output and Imports/
output are the exports and the imports in the sector divided by the total output in the sector. Private credit is the private credit by banks and other ﬁnancial institutions as a share of
GDP. Extern. ﬁn. is the sector-level measure of reliance on external ﬁnance. In columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) the control group consists of all countries (within the group of OECD/non-
OECD) that did not liberalize within the 20-year period. In columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) the control group is the country selected by the propensity score matching procedure (PSM).
All speciﬁcations are estimated using OLS, and including the ﬁxed effects speciﬁed in the table. Variable deﬁnitions and sources are described in detail in the text.
20 The PCM is essentially a measure of proﬁtability, or the ﬂow accrued to owners of
capital. Though imperfect as a measure of markups, it has the advantage of simplicity, and
has been widely used in the literature. It is also highly correlated to other indicators of
competitiveness, such as industry concentration ratios (see, e.g., Domowitz et al. 1986).
Furthermore, note that our empirical strategy relies on the time variation in this index.
Thus, to the extent thatmismeasurement occursmainly in the cross-section of countries or
industries rather than differentially over time, the results are still informative.
21 In particular, the fact that a large number of industrial sectors produce
intermediate inputs and have experienced higher growth following liberalization —
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run volatility on top on the temporary increase in medium-run
volatility resulting from the growth transition.
How does ﬁnancial liberalization affect the subcomponents of total
output analyzed in this paper? Fig. 3 presents the timing of the effects
for each channel affecting growth.18 Panel 1 presents the treatment
effect on the growth of the number of establishments. There is a
positive effect in the short-run, same as for the total output.19 Panel 2
presents the results on employment growth. These mirror the overall
output results: a positive and signiﬁcant short-run effect, becoming
muted at longer lags. The results for capital accumulation growth are
presented in Panel 3. What is interesting here is that the effect of
ﬁnancial liberalization is both longer-lasting, and increasing over time,
until the 9th year or so after liberalization. Thus, the capital
accumulation effect is more persistent than the other outcomes:
since capital apparently adjusts slowly, it takes longer to attain the full
impact. Unlike the output and employment effects, the effect of
ﬁnancial liberalization on capital accumulation is still positive at the
longest lag, but it is not signiﬁcant due to substantially widened error
bands. Panel 4 presents the TFP chart. Consistent with the regression
results from almost all of our speciﬁcations, there is no persistent
effect of ﬁnancial liberalization on TFP growth. It is only in the ﬁrst two
periods that TFP growth increases signiﬁcantly. To see whether there
is an effect on the level of TFP at 10 year horizon, we compound the
point estimates for each subsequent three-year interval. We ﬁnd a
cumulative level effect on TFP close to zero.
Finally, panel 5 considers another outcome, the level of the price-
cost margin. It is deﬁned as follows:
PCM =
value of sales − wages − cost of inputs
value of sales
;18 For the reasons mentioned in footnote 17, we do not report the time evolution of
the volatility of components of output. This ﬁgure is available upon request.
19 The results for the number of ﬁrms are not presented for the last period (9–11
years), as the coverage for the number of ﬁrms is more sparse than for other variables,
and thus there are not enough observations to obtain a reliable last period estimate.and ismeant to capture the sizeofmarkups, and thus the competitiveness
of the industry (see Braun and Raddatz, 2008).20 The effect of ﬁnancial
liberalization on the price-cost margin is negative and signiﬁcant, quite
pronounced, and appears persistent. We call this reduction in markups
the pro-competitive effect of ﬁnancial liberalization.
The ﬁnding of a reduction in the markups can, in part, explain why
we ﬁnd a permanent effect on the level output without any detectable
effects on TFP. Since the presence of markups introduces a wedge
between the marginal product of capital and the rental rate of capital,
their reduction can lead to a higher steady-state level of capital and
output, as shown by Galí (1994, 1995). Such a permanent effect on the
level of output is also likely to result in much larger welfare gains from
ﬁnancial liberalization than the ones implied by the standard
neoclassical model (Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2006).
A general feature of our results is the apparent lack of signiﬁcant
effects of ﬁnancial liberalization on total factor productivity growth.
These results should be interpreted with caution, as the construction of
TFPmay be subject to several measurement biases. First, we do not have
direct information on the use of intermediate inputs in sectoral
production. The direction of the resulting bias is hard to assess since it
depends on the change in the use of intermediate inputs relative to the
other factors of production.21 Second, as shown by Hall (1988), a changepossibly suggesting a higher demand for intermediates from other industries — is not
directly informative of the direction of the bias in measured TFP growth. An alternative
method is to derive total factor productivity growth from value added instead of
output. This approach has the advantage of controlling for the role intermediate inputs
but it requires separability between the value added production function and
intermediate inputs, a condition generally not met in industry-level data (see
Jorgenson et al., 1987). We nevertheless computed an alternative measure of TFP
based on value added and the results were unchanged.
Fig. 2. The time evolution of the growth and volatility effects of ﬁnancial liberalization. This ﬁgure depicts the treatment effect of ﬁnancial liberalization for the outcome variables
over time. The solid line is the coefﬁcient on the TREATED dummy variable in the years 0–2, 3–5, 6–8, and 9–11 after the liberalization episode. Dashed lines represent the 10%
signiﬁcance bands.
24 The ﬁrst assumption yields the level of aggregate TFP as a function of sector-level
TFPs:
At =
Yt
KαL1 − α
=
X
Ait
Kit
K
 α Lit
L
 1−α
:
219A.A. Levchenko et al. / Journal of Development Economics 89 (2009) 210–222in the Solow residual under imperfect competition can reﬂect both a
change in total factor productivity and a change inmarkups. Note that a
reduction in markups – suggested by the observed reduction in the
price-cost margin following liberalization – would if anything bias our
results in favor of ﬁnding a positive TFP effect.22,23 Finally, beyond
measurement issues, our results are consistent with the recent ﬁndings
of Hale and Long (2007) on the lack of productivity spillovers on
domestic ﬁrms stemming from foreign direct investment ﬂows.
4.4. Aggregation
Armedwith point estimates of how ﬁnancial liberalization changes
sector-level growth and volatility, we can now calculate what these
imply for the aggregate economy. In a country comprised of sectors
i= i=1,…, I, denote the level of an aggregate variable by upper case
YA, and its growth rate by lower case yA. The aggregate growth rate can
be written as:
yA =
XI
i=1
siyi ð4Þ
where si is the share of sector i in the overall level of YA in the country,
and yi is the growth rate of this variable in sector i. This paper
estimates the change in sector-level growth rate, Δy, that comes as a
result of ﬁnancial liberalization. The change in the aggregate growth
rate could be obtained from Eq. (4) in a straightforward manner:
ΔyA =
XI
i=1
siΔy = Δy: ð5Þ
That is, if in each sector the growth rate of a variable increases by
Δy, then the aggregate growth of that variable will rise by the same
amount.
Note that this expression applies to all variables we analyzed:
output, employment, capital stock, and TFP. To compute the change in
aggregate TFP in the same way as we compute changes in output,22 Using a fully speciﬁed model, Jaimovich (2007) shows that “true” TFP growth (zˆ) is
related to the change in the markups (μˆ) and the Solow residual (SR) as follows:
zˆ = SR + μˆ:
Since our measure of TFP is the Solow residual, a reduction in markups — negative μˆ —
implies that the “true” change in TFP is actually lower than our estimates, not higher.
23 See Hsieh and Klenow (2007) for a comprehensive analysis of the effect of
distortions on sectoral TFP in China and India.employment, and capital requires two additional simplifying assump-
tions. First, we must assume there is a Cobb–Douglas aggregate
production function Yt=AtKtαLt1−α. Second, we must assume a time-
invariant share of each industry in total output, total capital and total
employment. This assumption rules out composition effects. In the
presence of composition effects, aggregate TFP can increase purely
from expansion of high-TFP sectors and contraction of low-TFP
sectors, without any change in TFP at individual sector level. In
order to assess the empirical relevance of this mechanism, we re-
estimated the baselinemodel while allowing ﬁnancial liberalization to
affect growth in high-TFP sectors differently from growth in low-TFP
sectors. We found no evidence of composition effects due to ﬁnancial
liberalization: sectors with higher than average initial TFP do not
appear to grow systematically faster than sectors with low initial TFP
after liberalization (estimation results are available upon request).24
The empirical analysis above produces the point estimate Δybof the
change in sector-level average growth rate in the 10 years following
ﬁnancial liberalization. From Eq. (5) we immediately get ΔyAb =Δyb. By
the same argument, the standard errors of the aggregate growth
effects are simply equal to the standard errors of the sectoral growth
estimates for each variable of interest. Panel A of Table 7 reports the
estimated impact of ﬁnancial liberalization on aggregate growth rates
of the variables used in the analysis. Not surprisingly, they correspond
to the values reported in Tables 2 and 6 above.
Next, we evaluate the long-run impact of ﬁnancial liberalization.
Section 4.3 establishes that there is no long-run impact on growth.
However, the temporary growth impact over the ﬁrst 10 years following
liberalization compounds to yield a long-run level effect. Since the
growth effects of liberalization do not persist after 10 years, the
permanent level effect results from compounding each sectoral growtht t i t t
The second assumption leads to the change in the growth rate of aggregate TFP equal
to:
ΔaAt =
dAt
At
=
X
i
dAit
At
Kit
Kt
 α Lit
Lt
 1−α
=
X
i
dAit
Ait
Yit
Yt
=
X
i
siΔat = Δat ;
same as Eq. (5).
Fig. 3. The time evolution of the effect of ﬁnancial liberalization: channels. Notes: This ﬁgure depicts the treatment effect of ﬁnancial liberalization for the outcome variables over
time. The solid line is the coefﬁcient on the TREATED dummy variable in the years 0–2, 3–5, 6–8, and 9–11 after the liberalization episode. Dashed lines represent the 10% signiﬁcance
bands. All variables are in growth rates with the exception of the price-cost margin which is in level.
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estimated impact to be bΔYA∞ = 1 + bΔy 10− 1. Panel C of Table 7
reports the results. Given the point estimates, we compute the standard
errors using the delta method.25 In addition, in order to assess whether
this long-run impact is statistically different from zero, the t-test is not
sufﬁcient due to the non-linear transformation of the regression25 AssumingbΔy is close enough to its true value, we use the following ﬁrst order
Taylor approximation:
bΔYA∞ − ΔYA∞g10 1 + Δyð Þ9 · bΔy − Δy :
Therefore, E bΔYA∞ gΔYA∞ and
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Var bΔYA∞ 
r
g10 1 +bΔy 9 ﬃﬃﬃﬃbe2q where εˆ is the esti-
mated standard error of Δy.estimates. Therefore, the statistical signiﬁcance of the long-run level
effect reported in Table 7 comes from a Wald test of this non-linear
relationship. We can see that while the growth effect is conﬁned to the
ﬁrst decade after liberalization, its estimated long-run level effect is still
substantial. The level of aggregate output increases by 28%, behind a rise
of 25.5% in employment, and of 48% in the capital stock.2626 We choose to report the long-run level effect based on the estimates from the
baseline 10-year regressions in Section 4.1, rather than the 3-year interval regressions
in Section 4.3. This choice is dictated primarily by the substantial difﬁculty in
computing the standard errors of the level effect estimates based on the 3-year interval
regressions. The two methods produce very similar point estimates, however, that are
well within the conﬁdence interval for the level effects reported in Table 7.
Table 7
The impact on aggregate growth and aggregate volatility.
Short-run impact Long-run impact
Panel A: aggregate growth rate Panel B: aggregate volatility of output Panel C: aggregate level
Output Capital Employment TFP Herf-25 Herf-50 Herf-75 Output Capital Employment TFP
0.024⁎⁎⁎ 0.040⁎⁎⁎ 0.023⁎⁎⁎ 0.000 0.006⁎⁎⁎ 0.007⁎⁎⁎ 0.009⁎⁎⁎ 0.280⁎⁎⁎ 0.477⁎⁎⁎ 0.255⁎⁎⁎ 0.000
[0.006] [0.011] [0.005] [0.006] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.072] [0.151] [0.057] [0.062]
Notes: Standard errors in brackets (⁎⁎⁎ signiﬁcant at 1%). The short-run impact corresponds to the estimated changes in the aggregate growth rate/volatility over the 10 years
following an episode of ﬁnancial liberalization. These changes are computed based on estimates of Eqs. (1a) and (1b) and they use the industry-level estimates with the PSM control
group and Country and Group⁎Time ﬁxed effects (Tables 1, 2, and 6). The aggregate volatility impact is reported for three different values for the Herﬁndahl index: the 25th, 50th, and
75th percentile. The long-run impact corresponds to the permanent effect of ﬁnancial liberalization on the level of aggregate output, employment, capital and TFP. Details of the
computation of point estimates and standard errors are described in detail in the text.
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standard deviation of aggregate output is equal to:
ΔσA =
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃXI
i=1
s2i Δσ
2 =
ﬃﬃﬃ
h
p
Δσ ;
vuut
where Δσ is the impact of ﬁnancial liberalization on sector-level
volatility, and hu
PI
i = 1 s
2
i is the Herﬁndahl of production shares in
the economy.27 In contrast to the growth increase, the change in
sector-level volatility is moderated by the Herﬁndahl index of
production shares in the economy. Thus, for any given change in
sector-level volatility, the increase in aggregate volatility is much
lower. For instance, the median value of h in our sample is 0.087,
leading to the change in the aggregate volatility equal to about one
third of the magnitude of the change in sector-level volatility:
ΔσA=0.29⁎Δσ. Panel B of Table 7 reports the change in aggregate
volatility implied by the sector-level volatility estimates in this paper.
While the standard deviation of volatility at sector level is predicted to
rise by 2.2% in the decade following liberalization, the median
economy's aggregate volatility rises by only 0.7% due to diversiﬁcation
across sectors. This effect is quite minor: the average standard
deviation of aggregate output among the countries in our sample is
8.3%. In contrast to the growth effect above, the volatility impact will
vary depending on a country's level of diversiﬁcation across sectors. To
get a sense of the variation in the volatility impact across countries,
Table 7 also reports the change in aggregate volatility predicted for
countries in the 25th and the 75th percentiles of the diversiﬁcation
distribution (countries with lower Herﬁndahls are more diversiﬁed).
We can see that the impact does not differ too much, ranging from
0.6% for the more diversiﬁed country to 0.9% for the less diversiﬁed
one. The contrast between the aggregation of the growth and the
volatility estimates yields an interesting conclusion. While at the
sector level the growth and volatility effects appear similar in
magnitude, the aggregate growth effect is on average three times
larger than the aggregate volatility effect.
5. Conclusion
It is often argued, both theoretically and empirically, that ﬁnancial
liberalization should affect economic growth. At the same time, claims
that ﬁnancial liberalization increases volatility are made just as often.
This paper uses a large panel of industry-level data to analyze both
growth and volatility effects within the same empirical framework. A
key strength of our approach is the number of alternative strategies
we use to estimate these relationships. We employ a variety of
difference-in-differences estimates, and use both de jure and de facto27 This assumes that liberalization does not have a signiﬁcant effect on the
covariances between the sectors in the economy, which appears to be the case in
our data.measures of liberalization. We exploit sector characteristics, use non-
liberalizing countries as controls, develop a propensity scorematching
procedure to overcome selection on observables, and use a variety of
ﬁxed effects throughout to control for omitted variables. What is
remarkable is that the conclusions are virtually the same across all
empirical strategies.
There is strong evidence that ﬁnancial liberalization increases both
growth and volatility of output. Those effects are not long-lasting:
they typically vanish after 6 years. When it comes to channels, we ﬁnd
that ﬁnancial liberalization is accompanied by an increase in the
growth of employment and capital formation. Furthermore, liberal-
ization exerts pro-competitive pressures on the product market: there
is a transitory increase in the entry of ﬁrms and a permanent drop in
the price to cost margin. By contrast, the growth rate of TFP does not
appear to be affected by liberalization.
Thus, both growth and volatility increase as a result of ﬁnancial
liberalization, though admittedly the signiﬁcance of the volatility
results is uniformly lower. Can we say something about the net
welfare impact? While a complete treatment of the welfare question
would require a fully speciﬁed growth model and is therefore outside
the scope of this paper, it is relatively easy to pin down the direction of
the net effect. Lucas (1987) shows that the welfare beneﬁts of
removing all of the U.S. business cycle volatility areminuscule— about
0.05% of consumption. By the same logic, the adverse welfare impact
of higher volatility due to liberalization is quite small. In fact, the 3
percentage point reduction in consumption volatility Lucas consid-
ered is actually higher than the 1.5–2.5 percentage point increase in
output volatility implied by the estimates in this paper. Even for this
small adverse effect there are several mitigating factors. First, the
estimates in this paper are for the volatility of output, not consump-
tion. If agents can self-insure by smoothing intertemporally, the
implied welfare effect is lower. Second, the estimates are at sector
level. Thus, if there is any amount of risk sharing across sectors, the
adverse welfare impact would be reduced further. On the other hand,
though the growth effect of ﬁnancial liberalization is estimated to be
temporary, it still translates into a permanent level effect. The results
presented in this paper therefore imply that the welfare impact of
ﬁnancial liberalization is positive.
Acknowledgments
We are grateful to Mathieu Taschereau-Dumouchel for the superb
research assistance, and to the editors, two anonymous referees, Jean
Imbs, Olivier Jeanne, Raphael Lam, Gilles Saint-Paul, Aaron Tornell,
Thierry Tressel, Thijs van Rens, and workshop participants at the IMF,
Université de Genève, HEC-Lausanne, UCLA, PSE, INSEAD, HEC-Paris,
UC Santa Cruz, IADB, ESSIM (Izmir), and CREI/CEPR Conference on
Finance, Growth and The Structure of the Economy (Barcelona) for
helpful comments. The views expressed in this paper are those of the
authors and should not be attributed to the International Monetary
Fund, its Executive Board, or its management.
222 A.A. Levchenko et al. / Journal of Development Economics 89 (2009) 210–222Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in
the online version, at doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2008.06.003.
References
Alfaro, Laura, and Charlton, Andrew, 2007. International Financial Integration and
Entrepreneurship, NBER Working Paper 13118.
Attanasio, Orazio, Davis, Steven, 1996. Relative wagemovements and the distribution of
consumption. Journal of Political Economy 104 (6), 1227–1262.
Banerjee, Abhijit, Duﬂo, Esther, 2005. Growth theory through the lens of development
economics. In: Durlauf, Steven, Aghion, Philippe (Eds.), Handbook of Economic
Growth, vol. 1A. Elsevier Science Ltd., North Holland.
Barro, Robert J, Mankiw, N. Gregory, Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, 1995. Capital mobility in
neoclassical models of growth. American Economic Review 85, 103–115.
Beck, Thorsten, Demirgüç-Kunt, Aslí, Levine, Ross, 2000. A new database on ﬁnancial
development and structure. World Bank Economic Review 14, 597–605.
Bekaert, Geert, Harvey, Campbell, Lundblad, Christian, 2006. Growth Volatility and
ﬁnancial liberalization. Journal of International Money and Finance 25, 370–403.
Braun, Matias, Raddatz, Claudio, 2008. The politics of ﬁnancial development: evidence
from trade liberalization. Journal of Finance 63, 1469–1508.
Broner, Fernando, and Ventura, Jaume, 2006. Globalization and Risk Sharing, mimeo,
CREI-UPF.
Dehejia, Rajeev, Wahba, Sadek, 1999. Causal effects in non-experimental studies: re-
evaluating the evaluation of training programs. Journal of the American Statistical
Association 94, 1053–1062.
Dehejia, Rajeev, Sadek, Wahba, 2002. Propensity score matching methods for non-
experimental causal studies. Review of Economics and Statistics 84, 151–161.
di Giovanni, Julian, and Levchenko, Andrei A, in press. Trade Openness and Volatility,
Review of Economics and Statistics.
Domowitz, Ian, Hubbard, R. Glenn, Petersen, Bruce, 1986. Business cycles and the
relationship between concentration and price-cost margins. Rand Journal of
Economics 17, 1–17.
Galí, Jordi, 1994. Monopolistic competition, endogenous markups, and growth.
European Economic Review 38, 748–756.
Galí, Jordi, 1995. Product diversity, endogenous markups, and development traps.
Journal of Monetary Economics 36, 39–63.
Galindo, Arturo, Micco, Alejandro, Ordoñez, Guillermo, 2002. Financial liberalization:
does it pay to join the party? Economia 3, 231–252.
Glick, Reuven, Guo, Xueyan, Hutchinson, Michael, 2006. Currency crises, capital account
liberalization, and selection bias. Review of Economics and Statistics 88, 698–714.
Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier, Jeanne, Olivier, 2006. The elusive gains from international
ﬁnancial integration. Review of Economic Studies 73, 715–741.
Gupta, Nandini, and Yuan, Kathy, 2006. On the Growth Effects of Stock Market
Liberalizations, mimeo, Indiana University and University of Michigan.
Hale, Galina, and Long, Cheryl, 2007. Is There Evidence of FDI Spillovers on Chinese
Firms' Productivity and Innovation? mimeo, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
Hall, Robert E., 1988. The Relation between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry.
Journal of Political Economy 96, 921–947.
Hall, Robert, Jones, Chad, 1999. Why do some countries produce so much more output
per worker then others. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 83–116.
Hayashi, Fumio, Altonji, Joseph, Kotlikoff, Laurence, 1996. Risk-sharing between and
within families. Econometrica 64 (2), 261–294.Henry, Peter Blair, 2000a. Stock market liberalization, economic reform, and emerging
market equity prices. Journal of Finance 55 (2), 529–564.
Henry, Peter Blair, 2000b. Do stock market liberalizations cause investment booms?
Journal of Financial Economics 58 (1–2), 301–334.
Henry, Peter Blair, 2007. Capital account liberalization: theory, evidence, and
speculation. Journal of Economic Literature 45, 887–935.
Heston, Alan, Summers, Robert, Aten, Bettina, 2002. Penn World Table Version 6.1.
Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP).
Hsieh, Chang-Tai, and Klenow, Peter, 2007. Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in
China and India, mimeo, UC Berkeley.
Jaimovich, Nir, 2007. Firm dynamics and markup variations: implications for multiple
equilibria and endogenous economic ﬂuctuations. Journal of Economic Theory 137,
300–325.
Jorgenson, Dale W., Gollop, Frank M., Fraumeni, Barbara M., 1987. Productivity and U.S.
economic growth. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Jorgenson, Dale W., Stiroh, Kevin J., 2000. U.S. economic growth at the industry level.
American Economic Review 90 (2), 161–167.
Kaminsky, Graciela, Schmukler, Sergio, 2008. Short-run pain, long-run gain: the effects
of ﬁnancial liberalization. Review of Finance 12, 253–292.
Klingebiel, Daniela, Kroszner, Randall, Laeven, Luc, 2007. Financial crises, ﬁnancial
dependence, and industry growth. Journal of Financial Economics 84, 187–228.
Kose, M. Ayhan, Prasad, Eswar, Terrones, Marco, 2003. Financial integration and
macroeconomic volatility. IMF Staff Papers 50, 119–142 Special Issue.
Kose, M. Ayhan, Prasad, Eswar, Rogoff, Kenneth, and Wei, Shang-Jin, 2006. Financial
Globalization, A Reappraisal, IMF Working Paper 06/189.
Lane, Philip, and Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria, 2006. The ExternalWealth of Nations Mark
II: Revised and Extended Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970–2004,
IMF Working Paper, 06/69.
Levchenko, Andrei A., 2005. Financial liberalization and consumption volatility in
developing countries. IMF Staff Papers 52 (2), 237–259.
Lucas Jr., Robert E., 1987. Models of Business Cycles. Basil Blackwell, New York.
Mitton, Todd, 2006. Stock market liberalization and operating performance at the ﬁrm
level. Journal of Financial Economics 81 (3), 625–647.
Obstfeld, Maurice, 1994. Risk-taking, global diversiﬁcation, and growth. American
Economic Review 84 (5), 1310–1329.
Persson, Torsten, 2001. Currency unions and trade: how large is the treatment effect?
Economic Policy 435–448 (October).
Quadrini, Vincenzo, 2005. Policy commitment and the welfare gains from capital
market liberalization. European Economic Review 49 (8), 1927–1951.
Raddatz, Claudio, 2006. Liquidity needs and vulnerability to ﬁnancial underdevelop-
ment. Journal of Financial Economics 80, 677–722.
Rajan, Raghuram, Zingales, Luigi, 1998. Financial dependence and growth. American
Economic Review 88 (3), 559–586.
Saint-Paul, Gilles, 1992. Technological choice, ﬁnancial markets and economic
development. European Economic Review 36, 763–781.
Smith, Jeffrey, Todd, Petra, 2005. Does matching overcome LaLonde's critique of
nonexperimental estimators? Journal of Econometrics 125 (1–2), 305–353.
Tornell, Aaron, Velasco, Andres, 1992. The tragedy of the commons and economic
growth, why does capital ﬂow from poor to rich countries? Journal of Political
Economy 100, 1208–1231.
Tressel, Thierry, and Verdier, Thierry, 2007. Does Financial Globalization Discipline
Politically Connected Firms, mimeo, IMF.
United Nations Industrial Development Organization, 2006. Industrial Statistics
Database, CD-ROM.
